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Abstract
We propose a quantum voting system in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Our scheme violates a quantum analogue of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem,
which states that every (classical) constitution endowed with three innocuous-seeming properties
is a dictatorship. Superpositions, interference, and entanglement of votes feature in voting tactics
available to quantum voters but not to classical.
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Voting schemes used today are classical: Each voter submits one preference, and prefer-
ences combine deterministically into society’s preference. What if citizens could superpose,
interfere, and entangle votes? The quantization of voting schemes offers an opportunity to
explore the power of quantum information theory. This investigation furthers the tradition
of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma [1], in which players superpose
classical strategies and share entanglement [2].
We propose a quantum voting system that violates a quantum analog of Arrow’s Im-
possibility Theorem [3] and that accommodates entanglement and superpositions. Ac-
cording to Arrow’s Theorem, every (classical) dictatorship that has three innocuous-
seeming properties—that respects transitivity, unanimity, and independence of irrelevant
alternatives—is a dictatorship. Arrow’s Theorem is surprisingly deep and has spawned in-
terpretations of its mathematical formulation and of its implications about fair elections [4].
The theorem has fundamentally impacted game theory and voting theory. Yet Arrow’s
Theorem derives from classical logic, and a quantum extension turns out to be false.
Our approach differs from earlier quantum and classical work as follows. Quantum voting
theory has focused on privacy and cryptography [5–7], whereas we draw inspiration from
game theory. Classical voting is known to violate Arrow’s Theorem if voters’ opinions
are restricted to single-peaked preferences [8]. Rather than introduce an assumption into
classical elections, we recast Arrow’s scheme in quantum mechanical terms. Another classical
violation attempt involves probabilistic mixtures of votes. This attempt, however, violates
one of Arrow’s postulates [9].
The paper is organized as follows. We first define quantum votes, constitutions, and
constitutional properties. After introducing and disproving a quantum analog of Arrow’s
Theorem, we explore entanglement- and superposition-dependent voting tactics.
I. SOCIETIES, VOTERS, AND QUANTUM PREFERENCES
Let S denote a society that consists of N voters. Voter i = 1, 2, . . . , N is associated
with a finite Hilbert space Hi. By L(H), we denote the space of linear positive semidefinite
operators defined on the Hilbert space H. Society is associated with a joint state σsoc ∈
P(H1)× . . .× P(HN) that represents the votes.
Voter i has a quantum preference ρi that results from tracing out every subsystem except
the ith from society’s joint state: ρi := Tr
′(σsoc), wherein Tr′ denotes a trace over all voters
except i. We will sometimes denote a pure quantum preference by |ψi〉. The set of all voters’
quantum preferences forms society’s quantum profile P := {ρ1, . . . , ρN}, just as the set of
all voters’ classical preferences forms a profile in a classical election.
Let a, b, . . . ,m denote the M candidates ranked by voters. Society must form a transi-
tive ordered list, which we term a classical preference, of the candidates. In each classical
preference, each candidate is ranked above, ranked below, or tied with each other candidate:
a > b, a < b, or a = b. With each classical preference, we associate one pure state in each
of H1, . . . ,HN . For example, c > a = b > d corresponds to |c > a = b > d〉. We denote
by |γ〉 the γth classical-preference state and by χγi the associated density operator on Hi:
χγi := |γ〉〈γ|. The set {|γ〉} forms the preference basis BH for the Hilbert space H.
For each pair (a, b) of candidates, each Hilbert spaceH can be decomposed into subspaces
associated with the possible relationships between a and b. By Ga>bH , we denote the subspace
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spanned by the BH elements associated with a > b.1 The subspaces Gb>aH and Ga=bH are
defined analogously. For example, |a > b > c〉 occupies the intersection of three subspaces:
|a > b > c〉 ∈ Ga>bH ∩ Ga>cH ∩ Gb>cH . The a > b, b > a, and a = b subspaces are disjoint, e.g.,
Ga>bH ∩ Gb>aH = ∅.
Projectively measuring a quantum preference with BH yields a classical preference. If ρi
is a nontrivial linear combination or mixture of Bi elements, the measurement is nondeter-
ministic. A voter’s ability to superpose classical preferences resembles a prisoner’s ability to
superpose classical tactics in the quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma [1].
Elections proceed as follows: Every voter sends a quantum preference to an election
committee. The ρi’s enter a quantum circuit that implements a constitution (defined in
Sec. II). The circuit’s output is measured with Bsoc, yielding society’s classical preference.
II. QUANTUM CONSTITUTIONS
A classical constitution is a map from a classical profile to a classical preference. We will
define quantum constitutions, then review properties of classical constitutions and introduce
quantum analogs. Our quantization scheme is justified in Appendix A.
Definition 1 (Quantum constitution). A quantum constitution is a convex-linear com-
pletely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map2
E : P(H1)× . . .× P(HN)→ P(Hsoc)
that transforms society’s joint state σsoc into society’s quantum preference ρsoc:
E(σsoc ⊗ |0〉〈0|) = ρsoc, (2)
wherein |0〉〈0| denotes a fiducial state to which society’s quantum preference is initialized.
A. Four properties in Arrow’s Theorem
A classical constitution can have properties such as transitivity, respecting of unanimity,
respecting of independence of irrelevant alternatives, being a dictatorship, and respecting
of majority rule. The first four properties feature in Arrow’s Theorem. Let us review these
properties and define quantum analogs.
A classical constitution is transitive if every classical preference in its range is transitive.
A classical preference is transitive if a ≥ b and b ≥ c, together, imply a ≥ c.
Definition 2 (Quantum transitivity). A quantum constitution E respects quantum transi-
tivity if every possible output ρsoc, upon being measured in the preference basis Bsoc, collapses
to a state |a . . .m〉 associated with a transitive classical preference (a . . .m).
1 We will sometimes condense the subscript to Ga>bi := Ga>bHi and Ga>bsoc := Ga>bHsoc . These abbreviations will
be used elsewhere, as in notations for projectors and preference bases.
2 A convex-linear map E satisfies
E
(∑
i
piρi
)
=
∑
i
piE(ρi), wherein pi ≥ 0 ∀i and
∑
i
pi = 1. (1)
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Every E obeys quantum transitivity by definition: Given any input, E outputs a ρsoc that is
a linear combination or a mixture of preference-basis elements. A Bsoc measurement of ρsoc
yields a Bsoc element, which corresponds to a transitive classical preference.
A classical constitution that respects unanimity ranks a > b if every voter ranks a > b.
Definition 3 (Quantum unanimity). A quantum constitution respects quantum unanimity
if it has the following two properties: (i) Suppose that every voter’s quantum preference has
support on the a > b subspace: If Πa>bH denotes the projector onto Ga>bH , then Tr
(
Πa>bi ρi
)
>
0 ∀i. Society’s quantum preference has support on the a > b subspace: Tr (Πa>bsoc ρsoc) > 0.
(ii) If every voter’s quantum preference lacks support on the a > b subspace, so does society’s
quantum preference: Tr
(
Πa>bi ρi
)
= 0 ∀i ⇒ Tr (Πa>bsoc ρsoc) = 0.
A classical constitution respects independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if society’s
relative ranking of a and b depends only on the relative ranking of a and b by every voter.
How voters rank c does not affect whether society ranks a > b, a < b, or a = b.
Definition 4 (Quantum independence of irrelevant alternatives). A quantum constitution
respects quantum independence of irrelevant alternatives (QIIA) if whether ρsoc has support
on Ga>bsoc , on Ga<bsoc , and/or on Ga=bsoc depends only on whether each ρi has support on Ga>bi , on
Ga<bi , and/or on Ga=bi .
A classical constitution is a classical dictatorship if there exists a voter i such that, for
all pairs (a, b), society ranks a > b if and only if Voter i ranks a > b.
Definition 5 (Quantum dictatorship). A quantum constitution is a quantum dictatorship
if there exists a voter i who has the following two characteristics: (i) If Voter i’s quantum
preference has support on the a > b subspace, so does society’s:
Tr
(
Πa>bi ρi
)
> 0 ⇒ Tr (Πa>bsoc ρsoc) > 0. (3)
(ii) If Voter i’s quantum preference lacks support on the a > b subspace, so does society’s:
Tr
(
Πa>bi ρi
)
= 0 ⇒ Tr (Πa>bsoc ρsoc) = 0. (4)
B. Majority rule
We will disprove a quantum analog of Arrow’s Theorem with a quantum analog of ma-
jority rule. The majority-rule classical constitution ranks a relative to b as most voters
do. A subtlety arises if society’s profile P is cyclic. A set T = {a, b, . . . , k} of candidates
forms a cycle if every c ∈ T participates in pairwise preferences (e.g., b > c, c > d) that
appear in P and that violate transitivity. Every c ∈ T , furthermore, participates in such a
transitivity-violating pair with each other d ∈ T .
For example, consider P = {(a > b > c), (c > a > b), (b > c > a)}. A na¨ıve application
of majority rule implies a > b and b > c, whereupon transitivity implies a > c. But a
na¨ıve application of majority rule implies also c > a, so society’s classical preference must
respect c > a, which violates transitivity. The constitution may be defined as outputting
a = b = c or an error message. Because of cycles, classical majority rule fails to satisfy IIA
and transitivity simultaneously.3
3 One profile can contain multiple cycles. For example, {(a > b > c), (b > a > c), (a > c > b)} contains a
cycle over (a, b) (because Voters 1 and 3 rank a > b, whereas Voter 2 ranks b > a) and a cycle over (b, c)
(because Voters 1 and 2 rank b > c, whereas Voter 3 ranks c > b).
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A quantum extension of majority rule can have both properties. Before defining the
extension, we introduce quantum cycles. Let σsoc = χ
α
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ χµN denote a product of
preference-basis elements. Suppose that at least two χγi ’s correspond to classical preferences
that form a classical cycle. We will say that σsoc contains a cycle.
The Quantum Majority-Rule (QMR) constitution E sends each ρi through the phase-
damping channel Φ:
Φ(ρi) :=
∑
γ
|γ〉〈γ|ρi|γ〉〈γ| =
∑
γ
pγi χ
γ
i =: ρ
′
i, wherein
∑
γ
pγi = 1. (5)
QMR then processes the ρ′i’s as would the constitution E ′, defined as follows. By linearity,
E ′ (ρ′1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρ′N) =
∑
α,...,µ
(pα1 . . . p
µ
N) E ′(χα1 ⊗ . . .⊗ χµN). (6)
From χα1 ⊗ . . .⊗χµN , E ′ constructs a directed graph, or digraph. Each candidate is associated
with one vertex. Edges are formed from the χγi ’s. If more γ’s correspond to a > b than to
b > a, an edge points from a to b. If precisely as many γ’s correspond to a > b as to b > a,
then one edge points from a to b, and one edge points from b to a.
E ′ inputs the graph into Tarjan’s algorithm for finding the graph’s strongly connected
components [10]. A strongly connected component (SCC) is a subgraph in which every node
can be accessed from each other node via edges. Every vertex appears in exactly one SCC.
Every SCC in the QMR graph represents a cycle or a set of interlinked cycles. For example,
suppose E ′ acts on |bacd〉|acbd〉, whose > signs we have dropped to condense notation.
Candidates a and b participate in a cycle, as do b and c. The a, b, and c vertices form one
SCC; and the d vertex forms another, as shown in Fig. 1.
a b c d
1
FIG. 1: Digraph formed from |bacd〉|acbd〉 and inputted into Tarjan’s algorithm. Because a
and b form a cycle, while b and c form another, (a, b, c) forms an SCC. So does d.
Tarjan’s algorithm returns a list of the SCCs. Every vertex in the jth SCC is pre-
ferred to every vertex in the ith, if i < j. For example, Tarjan’s algorithm maps Fig. 1
to ({d}, {a, b, c}). E ′ forms a maximally mixed state over the classical preferences formable
from the candidates in each SCC. Combining the mixtures, E ′ orders the SCCs according to
preference (reverses the ordering outputted by Tarjan’s algorithm):
C[|abcd〉〈abcd|+ |cabd〉〈cabd|+ |bcad〉〈bcad|+ |cbad〉〈cbad| (7)
+ |bacd〉〈bacd|+ |acbd〉〈acbd|+ (terms that contain = signs)],
wherein C denotes a normalization factor.
Expression (7) contains terms associated with c > a and c = a, but every voter ranks
a > c. To respect quantum unanimity, E ′ projects Expression (7) onto the a > c subspace:
E ′(|bacd〉〈bacd| ⊗ |acbd〉〈acbd|) = 1
3
(|abcd〉〈abcd|+ |bacd〉〈bacd|+ |acbd〉〈acbd|). (8)
Formally, QMR is defined as follows.
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Definition 6 (Quantum Majority Rule). The Quantum Majority-Rule constitution E maps
σsoc to the same ρsoc as the following algorithm:
1. Calculate ρ′i for all i.
2. Evaluate E ′ (ρ′1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρ′N) =
∑
α,...,µ (p
α
1 . . . p
µ
N) E ′(χα1⊗. . .⊗χµN), wherein the quantum
constitution E ′ acts as follows.
(a) Form a digraph in which each node corresponds to one candidate and vice versa.
(b) For each pair (a, b) of candidates, count the χγi ’s associated with a > b, the χ
γ
i ’s
associated with b > a, and the χγi ’s associated with a = b.
(c) Construct the graph’s edges as follows: If more χγi ’s correspond to a > b than to
b > a, an edge points from a to b. If precisely as many χγi ’s correspond to a > b
as to b > a, then one edge points from a to b, and one edge points from b to a.
(d) Input the graph to Tarjan’s algorithm, which returns a list of the SCCs.
(e) Form an intermediate state ξ as follows: Associate each SCC with the maximally
mixed state over the classical preferences formable from the candidates in the
SCC. Combine the mixtures, to form a ξ defined on Hsoc, as follows: If a is in
the jth SCC and b is in the ith SCC, for any i < j, ξ is defined on Ga>bsoc .
(f) For each pair (a, b), if every χγi corresponds to a > b, project ξ onto Ga>bsoc .
To learn society’s classical preference rsoc, one measures the constitution’s output with
Bsoc. Due to this decohering measurement and to the dephasing channel Φ, rsoc can be
obtained by a random choice from among classical preferences, rather than from a quantum
circuit. But QMR is not equivalent to the classical majority-rule constitution F . Suppose
that F , given a cycle over at least three candidates, chose society’s preference randomly. F
would violate transitivity. QMR constitutions respect quantum transitivity by definition.
(As proved in Appendix B, QMR respects also quantum unanimity and QIIA.) This dis-
crepancy between classical and quantum majority rule enables QMR to violate a quantum
analog of Arrow’s Theorem.
III. ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that every classical constitution endowed with three
innocent-seeming properties is a dictatorship [3, 11].
Theorem 1 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem). Every classical constitution that respects
transitivity, unanimity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives is a dictatorship.
We quantize Arrow’s Theorem in the following conjecture, which we will disprove.
Conjecture 1 (Quantum Arrow Conjecture). Every quantum constitution that respects
quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity, and QIIA is a quantum dictatorship.
Theorem 2. The Quantum Arrow Conjecture is false.
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Proof. To simplify notation, we focus on strict preferences and drop binary-relation signs:
|abc〉 := |a > b > c〉. To prove the theorem by contradiction, we suppose that
P = {|abc〉, |cab〉, |bca〉)} (9)
The QMR constitution E constructs a digraph in which one edge points from a to b (because
two voters prefer a > b, whereas one prefers b > a), one edge points from b to c, and one
edge points from c to a (Fig. 2). The digraph consists of one SCC, and no candidate is
preferred unanimously to any other. Hence
ρsoc = C[|abc〉〈abc|+ |cab〉〈cab|+ |bca〉〈bca|+ |cba〉〈cba|+ |bac〉〈bac|+ |acb〉〈acb|
+ (terms that contain = signs)], (10)
wherein C normalizes the state.
ρsoc has a larger support than each of the votes. By Definition 5, no voter is a dictator. Yet
E respects quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity, and QIIA, by Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
Hence E violates the Quantum Arrow Conjecture.
a b c
1
FIG. 2: Digraph formed from {|abc〉, |cab〉, |bca〉}. All the candidates form one cycle.
One can understand as follows why our voting system violates the Arrow conjecture.
First, consider the motivations for quantizing elections as in Sections I and II. Given the
successes of quantum game theory, an election that accommodates superposed and entangled
preferences merits construction. To introduce superpositions and entanglement, one must
define a quantum election in terms of a general quantum process: a preparation procedure,
an evolution, and a measurement [12]. One must translate the definitions of “dictatorship,”
“transitivity,” etc. as faithfully as possible into properties of quantum systems. These
quantum definitions combine with QMR and a cyclic profile into a violation of the Arrow
conjecture.
Simpler disproofs exist, though the disproof above offers interpretational advantages. For
instance, a quantum constitution K that outputs a superposition over all inputs violates the
conjecture. But imposing K on society—choosing society’s classical preference randomly—
makes little economic sense. Also, disproving the conjecture with a quantum analog of
classical majority rule, which does not violate Arrow’s Theorem, demonstrates how quantum
mechanics invalidates the theorem.
IV. QUANTUM VOTING TACTICS
How one should vote, to secure the most desirable election outcome possible, is not
always clear. Strategic voting is the submission of a preference other than one’s opinion in
an election amongst at least three candidates, to secure an unobjectionable outcome.
For example, imagine that Alice, Bob, and Charlie vie for the presidency of the Amer-
ican Physical Society. Suppose that Alice and Bob have greater chances of winning than
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Charlie, and that Charlie agrees more with Alice than with Bob. Charlie’s supporters might
strategically vote for Alice, to elect a president whom they neither prefer most nor mind.
Quantum strategic voting and other quantum voting tactics rely on superpositions, in-
terference, and entanglement. For simplicity, we assume that σsoc is pure and focus on strict
preferences a > b. We will denote the classical preference a > b > . . . > m and its even
permutations by α, . . . , µ, as in Sec. I. Each anticycle m > . . . > b > a will be denoted by a
bar: α¯. Pure quantum preferences have the form∑
γ
(cγ|γ〉+ cγ¯|γ¯〉), wherein
∑
γ
(cγ + cγ¯) = 1. (11)
Society’s joint quantum state has the form
|σsoc〉 = (cα1 . . . cαN )|α . . . α〉+ . . .+ (cµ¯1 . . . cµ¯N )|µ¯ . . . µ¯〉. (12)
A. Quantum strategic voting via interference
Relative phases and interference facilitate quantum strategic voting. Consider a society
S whose voters submit pure states and that uses the following variation, dubbed QMR2, on
QMR.4 As an example, suppose that
P =
{
|abc〉, 1√
2
(|bac〉+ |acb〉), 1√
2
(|bac〉+ |cba〉)
}
, (13)
such that
|σsoc〉 = 1
2
(|abc〉|bac〉|bac〉+ |abc〉|bac〉|cba〉+ |abc〉|acb〉|bac〉+ |abc〉|acb〉|cba〉). (14)
Like the E ′ in the QMR definition, the QMR2 constitution E2 forms a digraph from each
|σsoc〉 term. Each graph is inputted into Tarjan’s algorithm, which returns a list of the SCCs.
Just as E ′ maps each list to a mixed state ξ, E2 maps the ith list to a superposition |ξi〉. In
the example,
4∑
i=1
|ξi〉 = 1
2
(|bac〉+ |bac〉+ |abc〉+ |acb〉) = |bac〉+ 1
2
(|abc〉+ |acb〉). (15)
If 〈Ξ|Ξ〉 6= 0, E2 normalizes |Ξ〉: |ρsoc〉 := |Ξ〉〈Ξ|Ξ〉 , and ρsoc = |ρsoc〉〈ρsoc|. If 〈Ξ|Ξ〉 = 0 (no
quantum system emerges from the constitution circuit), society can hold a revote.
Suppose that Voter 3 wishes to eliminate bac from society’s possible classical preferences.
Eliminating |bac〉 from |ψ3〉 will not suffice. Voter 3 can introduce a relative phase of −1,
such that society’s quantum profile becomes
P ′ =
{
|abc〉, 1√
2
(|bac〉+ |acb〉), 1√
2
(−|bac〉+ |cba〉)
}
. (16)
Tarjan’s algorithm leads to |Ξ〉 = 1
2
(−|bac〉+ |bac〉 − |abc〉+ |acb〉), so |ρsoc〉 = 1√2(|abc〉 − |acb〉).
Though keeping the undesired |bac〉 in |ψ3〉 contradicts our intuitions, interfering this super-
position with the other votes eliminates bac from society’s possible classical preferences.5
4 Because QMR2 is defined on just pure states and does not preserve all inputs’ norms, QMR2 does not
satisfy Definition 1. QMR2 can be thought of as an extension of quantum constitutions.
5 Alternatively, Voter 3 could submit a superposition of |abc〉 and |acb〉.
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B. Three entanglement-dependent voting tactics
As the QMR algorithm eliminates entanglement, we define the entanglement-preserving
variation QMR3. First, every ρi is measured in the preference basis. The outcomes form a
list L of classical preferences. If most of the preferences are identical—say, if most equal γ—γ
becomes society’s classical preference. If no majority favors any γ, the constitution randomly
chooses from amongst the classical preferences that appear with the highest frequency in L.
Entanglement can help one voter obstruct another. Suppose that the Supreme Court
justices vote via QMR3. Suppose that Justice Alice wants to diminish Justice Bob’s influ-
ence. However Bob votes, Alice should vote oppositely. Alice should entangle her quantum
preference with Bob’s; if Bob votes as in Eq. (11), Alice should form6∑
γ
(cγ|γ γ¯〉+ cγ¯|γ¯ γ〉). (17)
Insofar as γ represents Bob’s preference, Alice votes oppositely, with γ¯. Even if Bob changes
his mind seconds before everyone votes, Alice need not scramble to alter her vote.
Entanglement also facilitates party-line voting, if society uses QMR3. Suppose that Alice
leads the Scientists’ Party, to which Bob and Charlie belong. However Alice votes, Bob and
Charlie wish to vote identically. The voters should form the entangled state∑
γ
(cγ|γ γ γ〉+ cγ¯|γ¯ γ¯ γ¯〉), (18)
whose weights Alice chooses. This state generalizes the GHZ state: If the weights equal each
other and only two candidates run, Expression (18) reduces to 1√
2
(|ααα〉+ |α¯α¯α¯〉).
Finally, entangling voters’ quantum preferences can pare down society’s possible classical
preferences. Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie separately favor α twice as much as they
prefer β. Each voter plans to submit
√
2
3
|α〉+
√
1
3
|β〉, so society’s joint state is
|σsoc〉prod =
(
2
3
)3/2
|ααα〉+
(
1
3
)3/2
|βββ〉+ 2
33/2
(|βαα〉+ |αβα〉+ |ααβ〉)
+
√
2
33/2
(|αββ〉+ |βαβ〉+ |ββα〉). (19)
If the constitution is QMR3, society might adopt α or β as its classical preference.
Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie misunderstand entanglement. Eve can take advan-
tage of their ignorance to eliminate β from society’s possible classical preferences. Suppose
that Eve convinces the three citizens to submit
|σsoc〉ent = 1√
3
(|βαα〉+ |αβα〉+ |ααβ〉). (20)
This entangled analog of |σsoc〉prod, Eve might claim, represents the voters’ opinion by con-
taining twice as many α’s as β’s. But QMR3 cannot map |σsoc〉ent to β. Entangled states lead
to different possible election outcomes than product states. Equation (20), we note, general-
izes the W state: If only two candidates run, |σsoc〉ent reduces to 1√3(|βαα〉+ |αβα〉+ |ααβ〉).
6 Given how opinionated Supreme Court justices are, Bob might not mind broadcasting his quantum
preference to Alice.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
We have quantized elections in the tradition of quantum game theory. The quantization
obviates a quantum analog of Arrow’s Theorem about the impossibility of a nondictatorship’s
having three common properties. Superpositions, interference, and entanglement expand
voters’ arsenals of manipulation tactics. Whether other quantum tactics unavailable to
ordinary voters exist merits investigation. So does whether monogamy of entanglement [13]
limits one voter’s influence on others’ quantum preferences. If creating entanglement is
difficult (as in many labs), the resource theory of multipartite entanglement [14] might
illuminate how voters can optimize their influence. Other voting schemes could be quantized,
such as proportional representation (in which the percentage of voters who favor Party a
dictates the number of government seats Party a wins) and cardinal voting (in which voters
grade candidates).
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Appendix A: Classical limit
Our quantum voting scheme differs from classical schemes for the following reasons.
Quantum voters can superpose voting tactics, like prisoners who superpose tactics in the
quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma. Quantum voters can submit mixtures of classical prefer-
ences, whereas classical voters effectively submit Bi elements. (Superpositions and mixtures
may appeal to classical readers who agonize over choosing single classical preferences on
Voting Day.) Voters can entangle quantum preferences, as discussed in Sec. IV. Quan-
tum constitutions can output superpositions and mixtures of classical preferences. Finally,
preference-basis measurements replace the determinism of classical voting with probabilistic
maps.
Elections could be quantized in many ways. The definitions in Sections I and II have
merit because they depart minimally from their classical analogs. They depart, furthermore,
only because (i) the classical definitions lack meaning in the context of superpositions and
entanglement and (ii) quantum voting is modeled by a general quantum process, which
consists of a preparation procedure, an evolution, and a measurement.
We define as the classical limit any context in which every ρi is an element of tje [refer-
emce basos Bi. If ρsoc is a Bsoc element, society’s classical preference is determined (is not
probabilistic). Even in the classical limit, ρsoc may be a superposition of Bsoc elements or
may be mixed. QMR on cyclic inputs does not reduce to classical majority rule. For this
reason, QMR can violate the Quantum Arrow Conjecture.
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Appendix B: Properties of Quantum Majority Rule
QMR satisfies the three postulates in the Quantum Arrow Conjecture.
Lemma 1. The QMR constitution E respects quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity, and
QIIA.
Proof. By the definition of “quantum constitution,” E outputs a ρsoc that collapses to a
preference-basis element under a measurement of Bsoc. The Bsoc element corresponds to a
classical preference, which obeys classical transitivity by definition. Hence E obeys quantum
transitivity. Step (2f) of Definition 6 ensures that QMR respects quantum unanimity. Be-
cause E constructs ρsoc from the pairwise preferences calculated in Step (2b), QMR respects
QIIA.
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